STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:
We've called someone who worked on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Richard Nephew was the lead sanctions expert for U.S. negotiators and later served as deputy special envoy for Iran in the Biden administration. Good morning.
RICHARD NEPHEW: Morning.
INSKEEP: OK. So the premise of the situation the U.S. has set up here is that Iran is a threat, that it's time to make them not a threat, or much less of a threat, to eliminate what remains of the nuclear program after the U.S. strikes last year, among other things. How would you describe the Iranian threat at this moment, given the shape the country is in?
NEPHEW: Well, it's certainly the case that Iran's economy is in bad shape. And I think from that standpoint, you can see where the protest activity, you know, that's taken place over the last couple of weeks, probably has weakened a lot of regime cohesion. But what we really also see is that the Iranian government is completely dedicated to remaining in power, and that means that they're prepared to do anything to maintain their control both inside the country and potentially using military force outside of it through the missile program that they have and potentially their proxies as well.
INSKEEP: Let's just describe that 'cause there's a lot of talk of the missile program. What have they got?
NEPHEW: So they've got still a fairly significant medium-range ballistic missile capability. And medium sometimes gives the impression of not significant. Medium range just simply means how far the missiles can go, and that means they can absolutely still hit Israel as well as potentially targets further afield. They also have a fairly large arsenal of small-range missiles, short-range missiles that potentially could strike targets on the western side of the Persian Gulf, including considerable oil infrastructure. And that's a big threat, considering the United States is demonstrating in the case of Venezuela that it may take steps to try and prevent Iran from being able to export oil. The Iranians have made clear for years that if they can't sell oil, no one will.
INSKEEP: I just want to dig in on this a little bit more. During the 12-day war last year, the Iranians fired a lot of missiles at Israel. Most of them were shot down. Some of them did get through and cause casualties and damage. I think you're telling me that they could fire a lot more missiles at a lot more targets, including a lot of them that are not as well defended as Israel is.
NEPHEW: Yeah. I would say that the Iranians made a choice, as frankly did Israel and the United States and Gulf Arab states back in June, not to engage on energy-related targets, especially oil infrastructure. You know, the Israelis did not really target energy infrastructure in Iran. The Iranians didn't really target infrastructure outside of Iran. That could change. And especially if the Iranians believe that they are now facing regime change. As the president keeps making clear, this is something that, you know, he believes is the best outcome, and the Iranians are probably hearing that.
INSKEEP: OK. So the Iranians have missiles. They still have allies in the region, although they've been devastated in recent months and years. They still have some kind of nuclear program, even though it was severely set back - we think - last year by the U.S. strikes. Can you see the outlines of an agreement where the U.S. would get some demands to limit all of these things, and the Iranians would get whatever it is the Iranians would get out of that?
NEPHEW: I can see the lines of it, but it's really difficult. And it's really, really difficult to imagine at this point either the United States or Iran making the compromises necessary to get to a deal. You know, for the Iranians, they would potentially have to compromise on that missile program that they see as their only deterrence and their only threat against attack coming from both the United States, Israel and potentially others. For the United States, you know, because we have damaged the Iranian nuclear program so significantly, at this point, the things that we're asking for are very hard for the Iranians to deliver, including, you know, giving up their ability to enrich uranium in the future and their stockpile of highly enriched uranium that they already have, not to mention missile program proxies and similar. And then you got on top of that, the issue of sanctions relief in the time of regime instability. If you give the Iranians significant sanctions relief now, you are propping up the regime. And so I think there is still a question not only of whether or not a deal can be struck, but whether or not it's the right outcome from the standpoint of what the regime can and will do.
INSKEEP: Wow. You just point out that one possible outcome here is a little bit like the U.S. strike on Venezuela, where the U.S. got what it wanted, the president out, but left the regime in place and did not put protesters into power. You're saying that's one plausible outcome, even if the negotiation worked here.
NEPHEW: I think that's a very plausible outcome. And in fact, I think that there are a lot of people right now, especially opposition, you know, groups that are worried that what will happen is the Venezuela situation, which Supreme Leader Khamenei will potentially be eased out of power, or there'll be, you know, promises of some sort of reform. But at the end of the day, the system will remain in place because at the end of the day, it doesn't appear the United States is committed to, you know, making the kinds of regime change that would satisfy protesters' demands and address the concerns that we have.
INSKEEP: And of course, we're saying there if there was a deal, that would be the potential consequence. Richard Nephew, thanks very much for your insights. Really appreciate it.
NEPHEW: Thank you.
INSKEEP: He advised negotiators who brokered the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, also served in the Biden administration, and is now at Columbia University. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.
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